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S ince Toronto became the first stock exchange to computerize its execution system in 1977, electronic trading has been instituted in Tokyo (1 982), Paris (1 986), Australia (1 990), Germany 
(1 991). Israel (1991), Mexico (1 993). Switzerland 
(1995), and elsewhere around the globe. Quite likely, 
by the year 2000, floor trading will be totally eliminat- 
ed in Europe, predominantly in favor of electronic con- 
tinuous markets. 
Some of the new electronic systems are call mar- 
kets, however, including the Tel Aviv StockExchange, 
the Paris Bourse (for thinner issues), and the Bolsa 
Mexicana's intermediate market. In this article, we con- 
sider the call market as an alternative trading environ- 
ment that is particularly suitable to computerization. 
Recognizing the combined power of the com- 
puter and the call, several proprietary trading systems 
have introduced electronic batched trading in the 
United States. The Arizona Stock Exchange (AZX) 
instituted an electronic call market in Spring 1992. 
Previously, electronic crossing networks (a form of call 
market trading) had been established by Reuten 
(Instinet's "Crossing Network," 1987, J a e s  (ITG's 
POSIT, 1987, and the New York Stock Exchange (its 
afier-hours system. Crossing Networks I and 11, 1990). 
Additionally, a British proprietary system, TradePoint, 
plans to inaugurate an electronic market that includes 
both call and continuous trading in 1995. 
Scant attention has been given to incorporating 
an electronic call into a major market center so as to 
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provide investors with an alternative trading environ- 
ment (see Cohen and Schwartz [1989]). The innova- 
tion to market structure that we propose is incorporation 
of an electronic call market into a continuous trading system 
such as the New York Stock Exchange's agencylauc- 
tion market or Nasdaq's competitive dealer market. 
Specifically, we propose that the electronic call 
be held three times per day: to open the market, to 
close the market, and once during the trading day. 
Incorporating an electronic call into the continuous 
market will increase the efficiency of the U.S. markets 
and enable them to compete more effectively in the 
global market for order flow. 
ALTERNATIVE C A U  MARKET STRUCTURES 
The essence of call market trading is that orders 
are batched together for simultaneous execution, in a 
single multilateral trade, at a prespecified time, and at a 
single price - the value that best equates the aggregat- 
ed buys and sells. Buys at this price and higher, and selIs 
at this price and lower, generally execute. 
If, because of quantity discontinuities, an exact 
match between aggregate buys and sells does not exist 
at any price, buy orders placed at the clearing price do 
not execute in Ml (if buys exceed sells), or sells do not 
execute in fid (ifsells exceed buys). Time priority (the 
orders placed first execute first) or pro rata execution 
(an equal percentage of each order executes) is com- 
monly used to determine which orders to execute 
among those that have been placed at the lowest exe- 
cutable bid (if buys exceed sells) or at the highest exe- 
cutable ask (if sells exceed buys). 
Call markets may be structured in different 
ways, most notably with respect to the mechanism 
used for determining the clearing price. An auction 
where participants are physically present is typically 
organized as a price scan auction. In a price scan auction, 
an auctioneer announces tentative prices and partici- 
pants respond with their buy/sell desires. The price 
search procedure continues until the value that best 
balances the buy and sell orders is found. Examples of 
this type of call include art auctions, tulip bulb auc- 
tions, the old call market system of the Paris Bourse (if 
la d e ) ,  and the system currently used to open trading 
on the NYSE. 
An alternative to the price scan system is the 
sealed bid auction used by the U.S. Treasury. In gener- 
al, in a sealed bid/ask auction, participants submit priced 
orders that are not disclosed to other participants. At 
the call, orden are arrayed by price and cumulated h m  
the highest bid to the lowest bid for buy orders and 
t b m  the lowest ask to the highest ask for sell orders. 
The cumulated orden are matched against each other, 
and the clearing price is determined. A limitation of 
the sealed bid-ask auction is that it hides orders that 
some participants may wish to expose and that others 
would like to see. 
A crossing network also batches orders, but 
instead of determining the price within the batching 
process, it uses a price that has been set elsewhere. For 
example, POSIT, Instinet, and the two NYSE cross- 
ing network all cross orders at prices that have been 
established in the primary market centers. Instinet and 
the NYSE's afler-hours systems use closing prices, 
while POSITS intraday crosses use current intraday 
prices. For this reason a crossing network cannot be 
used as a stand-alone system - it does not itself pro- 
duce a clearing price. 
C d  market trading may also be structured as an 
open order book auction. This approach is used as the 
opening procedure in most electronic continuous mar- 
kets. For example, the opening procedures for 
Toronto's CATS, Tokyo's CORES, Paris's CAC, and 
Australia's SEATS are structured as open order book 
auctions. So too is the Arizona Stock Exchange's elec- 
tronic call market. 
Aggregated buy and sell quantities at each price 
are displayed once they have been received by the mar- 
ket, and all participants can watch the market as it 
forms. Orders are continuously aggregated and sorted, 
and the price that would be struck if the call were held 
at that moment is updated and displayed. We consider 
the open book electronic call the most suitable transactions 
network for a major market center. 
ATTRIBUTES OF THE CALL 
A securities market should be designed with 
regard to two objectives: reduction of the costs of trans- 
acting for the participants in a trade, and enhancement 
of the accuracy of price discovery for the broad market 
(see Schreiber and Schwarez [1986]). With these ends 
in mind, we now consider the call market with respect 
to issues concerning the need for immediacy, the use of 
electronic technology, order handling, information rev- 
elation, market transparency, consolidation of order 
flow, and the problem of he-riding. While many of 
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our comments hold for call markets in general, our dis- 
cussion for the most part applies to the open book elec- 
tronic call. 
Immediacy 
A perceived limitation of call market trading is 
that it does not allow for continuous access to the mar- 
ket. Alternatively stated, continuous trading is deemed 
desirable because participants can transact whenever 
they choose during a trading session. It has been wide- 
ly believed that traders do demand transactional imme- 
diacy, and our securities trading systems are for the 
most part based on the principle of continuous trading. 
In this regard, dealers and specialists as suppliers of 
immediacy have been considered essential to the oper- 
ations of the market. 
These assumptions should be questioned in 
three respects. First, the demand for immediacy is in 
part endogenous to the continuous market. Once a 
participant decides to seek a trade, that individual might 
wish to trade quickly in order to gain anonymity and to 
avoid having his or her order hnt-run. 
Second, dealers are not the only suppliers of 
immediacy and liquidity - knit  order traders can play 
an important role as well, depending on how the sys- 
tem is designed. In general, the need for intermediaries 
could be lessened as advances in electronic technology 
make direct access to the market increasingly feasible. 
Third, some market participants do not choose 
to pay the price for immediacy when they have an alter- 
native. These participants include limit order traders, 
passive investors, and others for whom lower trading 
costs are more important than transactional immediacy. 
For individual traders, the price of immediacy is the 
bid-ask spread, market impact, and higher commissions; 
for the market as a whole, it also includes less accurate 
price discovery and greater short-run price volatility 
We have elsewhere reported the results of a sur- 
vey we have used to assess asset managers' demand for 
immediacy (see Economides and Schwartz [1994]). 
Responses h m  150 equity traders at hnds that in total 
had roughly $1.54 trillion of equity under management 
indicate that the participants typically do not trade with 
maximum possible speed, and that they commonly 
work their orders patiently over time. 
For instance, nearly 25% of the respondents 
indicated that, for a $SO stock, they would regularly or 
fkquendy accept a trading delay of three hours if they 
could thereby save 25 cents in trading costs. Ncady 
50% indicated that they regularly or frequently take 
more than one day to execute a large order broken into 
smaller pieces. 
Use of Electronic Technology 
Non-electronic calls do not fully exploit the 
potential of call market trading. With computerization, 
participants can see the order flow and interact with the 
system on a real-time basis, entering their orders while 
the computer broadcasts the orders and indicated clear- 
ing prices. At the moment of the call, the computer 
finds the single price for each stock that clears the mar- 
ket, and market clearing prices for all issues can be 
determined simultaneously. 
Simultaneous clearing enables a customer's buy 
order for XYZ shares to depend on the price of ABC 
shares, the value of an aggregate market index, and/or 
simply the number of XYZ shares offered for sale at the 
customer's price or better.' This contrasts with the old 
non-electronic calls of Europe, where the markets for 
a e r e n t  shares had to be called sequentially, and the 
current NYSE opening procedure, where Uerent 
stocks are handled individually by the various specialists. 
Thus, in a call market, the computer serves an 
important computational tlnction. This contrasts with 
the continuous environment, where computer technol- 
ogy has served largely to accelerate the pace with which 
orders are submitted to the market and translated into 
trades. Under strtssftl conditions, this acceleration may 
be destabilizing. 
Order Handling 
Commission costs can be lower in call market 
trading because order handling is facilitated in that envi- 
ronment. Execution costs can be lower as well. Because 
orders are bunched together for simultaneous execution 
at a common clearing price, the bid-ask spread does not 
exist, large orders have less market impact, and large 
traders arr less apt to have their orders hnt-run. The 
risk of orders being hnt-run is further reduced if pub- 
lic traders are given direct access to the call. 
Batching has & h e r  advantages for order han- 
dling. Because all orders execute at a common clearing 
price, participants can put lirnit prices on their orders 
without extending a fiee option to others or risking 
being "picked off' (as long as enough participants are 
present at the call). In an electronic c d ,  participants can 
easily break an order up for entry at Herent  prices, a 
process known as "scaling." 
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In addition, contingencies can be put on orders. 
For example, a buy order's exposure to the market can 
be made contingent on the existence of a counterpart 
sell order. Customers may also place conditions on their 
orders that limit their total exposure at equilibrium in 
certain stock categories. At the same time, enabling 
participants to see the markets for individual stocks as 
they form may alleviate the need for customers to spec- 
Itj. contingencies. 
Idormation Revelation 
In expressing a desire to transact, traders reveal 
information about the existence of their orders and, in 
some systems, their identity Revealing this idonnation 
before a trade can be detrimental to the participant 
seeking to trade, because a stock's price will &e (fall) in 
the market when it becomes known that a large buy 
(sell) order is in the ot3Sng. 
Consequently, participants in a continuous rnar- 
ket attempt to hide information about their orders and 
try to execute their trades as quickly as possible once 
their intention to trade has become known to others. 
As we note earlier, this is not an inherent demand for 
immediacy. but a consequence of the trading process; 
the apparent demand for immediacy may in part be an 
attempt to prevent hnt-running. 
When a trade is realized, information is produced 
concerning the particulars of the transaction (price, quan- 
tity and time). Thus, a completed trade may be viewed as 
a joint product: the trade itself and information. In a con- 
tinuous market, the produced information is of no bene- 
fit to the transacting parties, but, because of the com- 
plexity of price dixovery, it is of considerable value to 
others who may be transacting in the near hture. 
In a call market, on the other hand, the pro- 
duction of price information-is simultaneous with the 
execution of a multilateral, batched trade, and the 
value of this information does accrue to the partici- 
pants in the trade. 
Market Transparency 
At least some participants must announce the 
prices at which others can trade ifa market is to form. 
Participants who place their orders early prmride infor- 
mation and liquidity to those who place their orders 
closer to the time of the call. But each individual, while 
pderring that the market be transparent, is reluctant to 
disclose his or her own order - there are strong advan- 
tages to letting others be the providers of liquidity and 
suppliers of information. Once enough orders have 
been placed, however, the call provides a particularly 
transparent and orderly environment. 
The problem of getting participants to reveal 
their orders early in call market trading can be handled 
in several ways. One way to encourage early order 
placement is to enable participants to enter orders with 
the contingency that their orders not be disclosed to 
the market unless counterpart orders of su3icient size 
have also been placed. Although a contingent order is 
not revealed to other traders until its conditions have 
been satisfied, it has, most importantly, been entered 
into the system. 
Because the system knows of contingent orders 
on both sides of the book, trades will be made that might 
otherwise not have been found. And, because partici- 
pants can easily scale and put contingencies on their 
orders, the need for transparency is reduced - a trader 
can simply spec* his or her parameters and rely on the 
computer to work out the trades (see Schwartz [1993]). 
Early order disclosure can also be encouraged in 
call market trading by using time priorities and by 
charging lower commissions for orders that have been 
placed earlier in the entry period that precedes a call. 
For example, AZX's electronic call uses time priority 
rules and time-dependent commission rates for this 
purpose. (See Economides and Heisler [1994b] for a 
discussion of the fee schedule in a call market.) 
Consolidation of  Order Flow 
For a trade to be realized, buyers and sellers must 
meet in two dimensions: time and place. The set of par- 
ticipants who meet to trade can be viewed as a net- 
work. When a transactions network includes a larger 
number of participants, counterparties can more easily 
h d  each other in time and in place, and transaction 
prices arc expected to be in closer alignment with 
underlying equilibrium values. 
Because the size of the network contributes pos- 
itively to the value of the good that is being produced, 
the market may be said to exhibit positive network exter- 
nalirie~.~ Positive externalities in a trading network 
explain why order flow attracts order flow; they give a 
large market center such as the NYSE a strong com- 
petitive advantage. 
For a given market size, consolidating the order 
flow increase the efficiency of a transactions network, 
stabilizes prices, and ficilitatts survdllance activities. 
Orders can be consolidated geographically (in one place) 
and temporally (over time). For the most part, recent dis- 
cussions concerning market design have focused on the 
geographic consolidation of orders in a continuous mar- 
ket environment. But temporal consolidation also 
strengthens a transactions network by enabling counter- 
parties to 6nd and to trade with each other more easily. 
Order flow is necessarily fragmented temporally 
in continuous market trading. Moreover, order flow 
can fragment spatially in a continuous environment as 
satellite markets offer fast execution and charge low 
commissions while he-riding on the price discovery 
and other services provided by a major market center, 
as is suggested by Bloch and Schwartz [1978]. 
The problem may be eliminated with call mar- 
ket trading. Introducing a call into a continuous market 
will naturally focus orders at specific points in time. 
This temporal consolidation in turn encourages spatial 
consolidation because it counters the fhe-riding prob- 
lem. Because orders are less apt to fiagment spatially, 
the need for an order focusing rule such as NYSE Rule 
390 is obviated3 
The Free-Riding Problem 
Prices can be pirated with relative ease in a con- 
tinuous market because trading takes place while prices 
are being set. A trade in the continuous market estab- 
lishes a price, and the posting of quotes gives the price 
continuing validation until new quotes and/or a new 
transaction price are set. Hence, prices established on 
the NYSE can become the benchmarks againstwhich 
orders can be executed on the regional exchanges or 
through proprietary trading systems. 
These off-board trades do not contribute to 
price discovery and are of no benefit to those partici- 
pants who have actively participated in price discovery 
by posting quotes on the market. On the contrary, h e -  
riding diminishes the extent to which the positive 
externalities of a trading network can be realized. 
Because trading in a call market results in all orden 
collecdvely determining the price, it reduces the possibil- 
ity of &e-riding on price discovery. The indiated dear- 
ing price before the can is only tentative. At the call, 
orden ut batched together, the clearing price is found, 
the trades are made, and the market is dosed. Afler the 
call, the clearing price has rapidly d i m m h q  validity 
PROPOSAL. 
The introduction of an electronic call in a major 
market center such as the NYSE or Nasdaq would be 
one of the most far-reaching, powerful innovations that 
could be made in the design of a trading system. The 
innovation would provide important benefits for both 
institutional and retail investors, as well as listed compa- 
nies and securities firms. We suggest that an open book 
electronic call be integrated with continuous trading 
three times a day - at the market's opening, at noon, 
and at the market's close. 
At the open. A n  electronic call at the market open- 
ing would facilitate order entry and price discovery 
at this particularly critical moment in the trading 
day. Institutional investors who currently wait for 
the market to open before submitting their orders 
would be more likely to participate in an interactive, 
electronic opening. This would improve the accu- 
racy of price discovery for the aggregate market. 
Mid-day. A mid-day call would counter he-riding 
on price discovery. It would help assure investors 
that their orders will not be front-run, would fad- 
itate price discovery, and would contribute to the 
overall stability of the market. 
At the close. Closing the market with an electron- 
ic call would aLo sharpen the accuracy of price dis- 
covery at a time of critical importance because of 
the broad use to which closing prices are put (such 
as accounting and regulatory reporting, portfolio 
performance evaluations, derivative benchmarks). 
INVESTORS' PERSPECTIVE 
The continuous market is a dif5cult and expen- 
sive environment in which to operate: bid-ask spreads 
exist; commission costs are higher; the market impact 
of individual orders is accentuated; orders are more eas- 
ily hnt-run; satellite markets fke-ride on prices set in 
the major market centers; and so forth. In behavior 
symptomatic of the acuity of working orders in the 
continuous market, exchange specialists commonly 
stop orden, and do not display all limit orders to the 
market. Because of the high cost of trading in the con- 
tinuous market, order flow is increasingly being divert- 
ed to alternative markets such as Instinet's Crossing 
Network, POSIT, and AZX. 
Instinet offen one cross per day. The Crossing 
Network enables matched orders to execute after the 
markets have dosed at dosing transaction prices for 
NYSE issues, and at the midpoints of the bid-ask 
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spreads for OTC securities. Instinet does not provide 
volume figures, but one may presume that The 
Crossing Network has experienced appreciable growth 
since 1988, its &st full year of operations. 
POSIT offers crosses during the regular trading 
day in four preamounced, seven-minute trading win- 
dows. Each of the four crosses is held at a randomly 
selected point within its seven-minute window. Orders 
are executed only to the extent that matches are found, 
and trades are priced using the midpoint of the bid-ask 
spread at the time of the match established in the major 
market centers. During 1488, its &st full year of oper- 
ations, POSIT averaged 152,000 shares per day. For 
1994, the system averaged 4.1 million shares per day, 
single-~ounted.~ 
AZX holds an open book electronic call that 
executes trades at 5:00 p.m. EST. AZX has also experi- 
enced some sizable trading volume since its opening on 
March 30, 1992. In its first quarter of operations, the 
second quarter of 1992, it traded an average of 143,000 
shares per day. For 1994, the system averaged 487,000 
shares per day, single-~ounted.~ 
In j e  current stage of their development, these 
proprietary systems do not enable customers to know 
in advance if they will realize an execution. POSIT and 
Instinet Crossing Network customers do not know pre- 
cisely when the trades will take place. And, except for 
Instinet's Crossing Network, the customers do not 
know the prices at which they will trade. 
Despite these uncertainties, the proprietary trad- 
ing systems are attracting sigdicant volume. This is tes- 
timony to investors' need for a better trading system. 
Simply put, customers are using the proprietary trading 
systems because these systems help them gain anonymi- 
ty and reduce the cost of trading. Preliminary evidence 
suggests that call market tradmg is indeed a desirable 
alternative for some participants at least. 
THE LISTED COMPANIES' PERSPECTIVE 
Holding calls three times a day would dinctly 
improve the performance of the equity markets for the 
listed companies. Because liquidity and price stability 
are, ceteris paribus, associated with higher share prices, 
more liquid and stable secondary markets should facili- 
tate the capital-raising ability and result in lower costs 
of capital for the listed companies. Listed companies 
would also benefit from d c i e n t  secondary market 
operations because they themselves are investors. 
Corporate pension funds, postretirement medical plans, 
and other corporate-sponsored hnds are becoming 
ever more important as their pools of investment capi- 
tal continue to increase. 
Therefore, the listed companies should them- 
selves be free to commit capital to market-making if 
they so choose (see Schwartz [1988, 19911). The con- 
cern about corporate involvement in market-malung is 
that firms would use the procedure inappropriately to 
manipulate their share prices. Therefore, formal mar- 
ket-making has been lefZ to independent third pames. 
The manipulation problem can be dealt with, 
however, by having the corporate orders entered 
according to a prescribed procedure, and a third-party 
fiduciary could be used to run the corporate stabiliza- 
tion programs (see Schwartz [1991]). A system to do 
this, PIBAL, is currently being implemented in France 
(see Jacquillat, Schwartz, and Hamond [1994]). PLBAL 
enables corporations to provide additional liquidity to 
the market for their own stocks through a liquidity hnd. 
The objective of stabilization is to damp excess 
volatility caused by temporary buy/sell imbalances. The 
electronic call provides the most suitable environment for 
capital to be committed to this end For this reason, in 
France, PEAL call orders will be entered for execution in 
CACS call market only. Liquidity trades cannot be made 
effectively in a continuous market because the liquidity 
orders would retard the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
and, in so doing, ben&t some traders unjustifiably. 
For example, suppose a stock's equilibrium price 
falls h m  50 1/2 to 49 1/2 with stabilization. Further 
suppose that a liquidity order of a given size has been 
entered at 50. In the continuous market, the liquidity- 
providing purchase would be made at 50; in the call, it 
would be made at 49 1/2. 
There is no reason to enable some public trader 
to sell at 50 when the new equilibrium price is 49 1/2, 
and a transaction at 50 would be misleading for the 
market and costly for the liquidity provider. In a call 
market, clearing prices simultaneously d e c t  all orders, 
including those entered for liquidity-providing purpos- 
es, and all orders transact at the same price. 
The Herence between the call and the contin- 
uous markets is that the call market is an explicit price 
discovery mechanism, and price discovery and the pro- 
vision of supplemental liquidity arc effectively integrat- 
ed in the call. That is why, in the situation just 
described, the liquidity-providing order would execute 
at 49 1/2 even though it was entered at 50. 
THE EXCHANGES' AND 
BROKERAGE HOUSES' PERSPECTIVE 
Exchanges have traditionally been institutions 
where intermediaries meet to trade on behalf of their 
customers, and a market center such as the NYSE does 
not allow direct access by customers. The NYSE, of 
course, does not itselfparticipate in the trading. It pro- 
vides the floor and the systems that exchange members 
(specialists and other floor traders) use. 
In electronic call market trading, on the other 
hand, public orders are batched and executed in mul- 
tilateral transactions without the intervention of inter- 
mediaries, and the electronic call itself makes the 
trades. Public participants could continue to access the 
market through a member firm if they want. Many 
customers, especially smaller retaii clients, would no 
doubt choose to have the& orders entered for them by 
their brokerage firms. 
But those who want to should be able to route an 
order through a member's account (and via its wire con- 
nection) to the exchange so that the order may be placed 
without.the brokerage firm's knowledge or intervention 
(subject, of course, to the enforcement of prespeded 
trading limits and control over access to the system). 
Because the electronic call, not the intermediary, 
makes the trades, customers could be charged an 
exchange fee for call market transactions. Exchange fees 
should be set according to a uniform schedule that 
applies to all customers. The fee per share should be a 
decreasing fknction of the size of an order. And, as dis- 
cussed, to encourage early order placement, the 
exchange! fee should also be a decreasing hnction of the 
amount of time before the next call that an order has 
been placed. That is, the fee should be lower for an 
order placed one hour before the call than for an order 
placed one minute before the cd .  
The overall fee structure should be set high 
enough to ensure adequate profitability for the 
exchange and its member &XIS. Part of the exchange 
fees should be passed back to the brokerage houses to 
compensate the member hrms for having provided the 
securities information and other services that brought 
the customers to the market. Brokerage house revenues 
from their share of the exchange fees could be substan- 
tial, and the income would be relatively riskless. 
Moreover, the cost to the brokerage houses of provid- 
ing trading services would be greatly reduced because 
of the economies inherent in call market trading. 
Accordingly, both the exchange and the broker- 
age houses should,find the system attractive. There is no 
reason why a market that is highly e5cient should not 
be profitable for its necessary constituents. 
THE REGULATORS' PERSPECTIVE 
Just as the call market facilitates operations from 
the users' points of view, it simplifies governance fiom 
a regulatory point of view The role of intermediaries is 
lessened; the market is harder to manipulate; and the 
audit trail is less complicated. To date, however, regula- 
tory issues have been assessed in the context of the con- 
tinuous market, and they have remained murky. 
Issues concerning market structure, competi- 
tion, fragmentation, and transparency have been 
debated for the past two decades by government reg- 
ulators, practitioners, and academicians, never with 
adequate res~lution.~ Perhaps the regulatory emphasis 
has been misplaced: 
Attention has focused primarily on the cost of 
immediacy in an environment structured around 
its provision, while the accuracy of price discovery 
has received little attention. Unfortunately, the 
provision of immediacy can impair the accuracy of 
price discovery. 
Much emphasis has been given to strengthening 
interdealer competition, and relatively little to 
intermarket competition. Yet intermarket competi- - 
tion is the primary spur for the development of 
superior technology. 
The debates concerning the consolidation of order 
flow have dealt with the geographic dimension, not 
the temporal dimension. Consolidating orders at a 
- particular time is of equivalent importance, and it 
also counters the tendency for orders to fiagment 
spatially by eliminating the he-riding problem. 
Transparency has been considered with regard to 
the display of quotes and transaction prices, not to 
the submission of orders by traders. Although lit- 
tle discussed, participants' reluctance to disclose 
their orders 4 perhaps the greatest impediment to 
transparency. 
In short, if the provision of immediacy were de- 
emphasized, and domestic intermarket competition 
encouraged, we expect that trading systems will natu- 
rally evolve so that orders will be appropriately consol- 
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idated and markets will be adequately transparent. The environment from a regulatory point of view. 
end result will be lower transaction costs and more As for the SEC's concern with strengthening 
accurate price discovery for the broad market. competition, the most serious barriers are those that 
 his will not occur if competition is stifled in foreclose innovations that are hlghly desirable for buy- 
the securities industry Currently, for both exchange side traders and the listed companies. But new technil- 
and dealer markets, public traders do not have direct ogy is a powerful force. If payments for services are e5-  
access to participants on the other side of the market, ciently structured, meanin* innovations can be 
but must use intermediaries. Listed companies are not made. If so, important constituencies on both the buy 
free to make markets in their own stocks, but must and sell sides of the market will benefit. 
rely on third-party market makers. Various rules hin- In the meantime, the efficiency of the U.S. equi- 
- .  
der the use of limit orders by public traders (primar- 
ily on the Nasdaq, but to an extent on the NYSE as 
well). And, emerging systems such as Instinet, 
POSIT, and AZX are hindered by regulation (such as 
the requirement that prices established during the 
trading day be integrated with the Intermarket 
Trading System). 
The major anti-competitive barriers are not the 
ones that weaken interdealer competition, but those 
that shield the profitable operations of brokeddealer 
firms as a group. Because of these barriers, innovations 
that could be highly desirable for traders and the listed 
companies are not occurring. 
CONCLUSION 
We have proposed that an electronic call be used 
three times a day by a market center such as the NYSE 
or Nasdaq: to open the market, at noon, and to dose 
the market. Ironically, the proposal could be resisted for 
either of two opposing reasons. First, the call may be 
thought to be an in@cient environment that does not 
cater to the needs of customers, primarily because it 
does not allow traders immediate access to the market. 
Second, the call may be thought to be such a highly efl- 
dent environment that it would reduce the profits of the 
suppliers of trading s e ~ c e s  (exchanges, securities 
firms, and other sell-side traders). 
We have argued that a call market is a highly 6- 
cient transactions network We question the importance 
of immediacy for many public traders, and suggest that a 
si@cant proportion would choose not to pay the price 
of immediacy if a viable alternative were available. 
The call is the only environment within which 
meanin@ capital can be committed to supplying li- 
quidity and stability to the market, and it provides an 
ty market is best improved, and the challenge of inter- 
national competition for order flow is best met, by 
streamlining the regulatory environment, removing 
competitive barriers in the industry, and letting compe- 
&tion accomplish the rest. 
ENDNOTES 
The authors thank Laura Garbw br her assistance in pro- 
ducing this article. 
'Finding simultaneous solutions to demand/supply equations 
br all stocks when various conringencia arc put on the orden requires 
a complex algorithm. 
*Markets with nctiwrk atonalities have meived increasing 
attention in the indusaial onpkation licmture in recent  yea^. The 
approach has yielded new insights in telecommunications. electricity 
networks. and other high-technology industria. Applications are not 
Iimited to tndi t iod "neework" induma, but aka indude industries 
that w compatible components such as IBM-compatible software and 
hardware, picture telephones, and ficsimile machina. See Rohlfi 
[1974]. Furell and Saloner [1985], Kits and Shapim [1985]. 
Economida [1989.1993,1994.1995], Economida and White [1994]. 
Economida and Siow [1988]. Economida and Heisler [1994a, 1994b1, 
and Economida and Schwua: [I 9941. 
'Note that Bloch and Schwartz's [I974 analysis of how the 
order flow can w e n t  in rhe absence of an order focusing rule applies 
to the continuous d e e .  
'The single-counting of mnsaction volume mans that a 
share changing hands is counted just once (rather than adding together 
the number of shares purchared and the number sold). The data on 
share volume here are provided by POSIT. 
SBccause of its low volume. U X  has hct ioned predomi- 
m d y  like a crossing network. Its price discovery capability would nat- 
d y  operue at larger voluma. Thee &a on rhve volume arc pro- 
vided by Azx. 
6Mort recently, the U.S. Securities and E x c h g e  
Commirtion's Division of Market Rcguhcion gnpplcd with ehae 
irma in its Market #)o study [1994]. 
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